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Abstract
A decade  long experience  shows that monitoring  the  approach that relies on performance  rankings based on
performance  of public and private monopolies in South  comparative  efficiency  measures.  The authors show that
America is proving to be the hard  part of the reform  with the  rather modest data currently  available  publicly,
process.  The operators who control most of the  such an approach  could yield useful  results.  They provide
information needed  for regulatory purposes have little  estimates of efficiency  levels in South America's  main
interest in volunteering their dissemination  unless they  distribution  companies between  1994  and 2000.
have an  incentive to do so. Estache,  Rossi,  and Ruzzier  Moreover,  the authors show how relatively  simple tests
argue that, in  spite of, and  maybe because  of,  a much  can  be used by regulators to check the robustness of their
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INTRODUCTION
Following  the  process  initiated  by  Chile  about  20  years  ago,  many  South  American
countries  have  transformed  their electricity  sector.  The  changes  started  with a restructuring  to
increase  competition  in  and  for  the  markets.  They  entailed  an  unbundling  of  electricity
generation,  transmission  and  distribution  and  resulted  in  generally  competitive  generation
markets  but  maintained  monopolies  for  transmission  and  distribution  which  were  generally
auctioned  to  private  operators.  Whenever  possible,  reformers  also  broke  up  horizontally  the
former national distribution companies  into several regional monopolies  to reduce the strength of
the  residual  monopolies.  In most countries,  these changes  were  associated with  the  creation  of
new regulatory agencies  responsible for the monitoring of the performance of the residual public
and private monopolies.
A decade  long experience  shows that  this monitoring  is proving to be the hard part of the
reform.  The  private  operators  control  most  of the  specific  information  needed  for  regulatory
purposes and have little interest in volunteering their dissemination unless they have an incentive
to do so. Most of the regulators  have tried to mandate the publication of information.  Many have
also relied on public  audiences  to promote public debates  of relevant information.  The results of
these approaches  to reducing the information  asymmetry  between regulators  and operators  have
been mixed at best.'
This paper argues that in spite of,  and maybe because of, a much weaker  information base
and  governance  structure,  Latin  America's  electricity  sector  could,  thanks  to  a  much  more
effective  cross-country  coordination,  reduce  the  information  asymmnetry  by  relying  on3
performance  rankings based on comparative  efficiency  measures,  as achieved with some success
by  various  regulators  in  England  and  recently  by the  Dutch  electricity  regulator.  While  never
spelled out quite in the  specific  terms  adopted here, what the approach  essentially  achieves  is a
shift  of  the  burden  of  proof  for justification  of bad  performance  from  the  regulator  to  the
operators by relying on competition between markets more systematically.2 The authorized levels
of recoverable  costs or the performance  levels recognized by the regulators  to assess the share of
efficiency  gains to be  passed on to consumers  can be  estimated  from best practice benchmarks
obtained  by comparing  performance  across  markets.  Unless  the  operators  can  prove  with  the
appropriate  information  that their performance  is sub-par for specific  reasons  they will  have  to
comply with the regulatory  assessment  of their performance  based  on the approaches  suggested
here.
Coordination  is needed  because  this  benchmarking  approach  to regulation,  which  further
promotes  competition  between  markets,  requires  the  best  possible  assessments  of  cost  or
production frontiers across countries and this in turn requires a minimum of coordination  in terms
of  the  definition  and  measurement  of the  indicators  to  be  used  in  the process.  As  large  as
possible a number of operators must be monitored over 3-4 years at least to maximize the quality
of the data available.
The  paper  shows  that  with  the  rather  modest  data  currently  available  publicly,  such  an
approach  could  already yield  useful  results.' It  provides  estimates  of efficiency  levels  in South
A  theoretical  approach  to  this regulatory  problem,  in terms  of principal-agent  games,  can  be  found  in Bogetoft
(1997),  where  the selection  of a efficiency  measurement procedure  appears  as the Nash equilibrium  of a regulatory
game.
2  This approach has also been  advocated  for the Mexican  Port sector by Estache, Gonzalez  and Trujillo  (2002), for
instance, and  more generally in Coelli,  Estache, Perelman and Trujillo (2002).4
America's  main  distribution  companies  between  1994  and  2000.  Moreover,  it illustrates  how
relatively  simple  tests  can  be  used by  regulators  to  check  the robustness  of their  results  and
strengthen their position  at regulatory hearings.  This is important  since efficiency  estimates  used
by regulators  to shift the burden of proof on the operators are likely to be contested routinely by
unhappy operators.  The quality of the regulatory  assessments  should be such that improvements
in efficiency  measures would only  come from  additional information  provided by the operators
trying to make their case rather than from improvements in the use of the existing information.
The  paper is organized  as follows.  Section  1 specifies  the  model which  could be used by
coordinated regulators and argues  for a production function rather than a cost function.  Section 2
discusses  the  data  currently  available  to  test  the  chosen  model  and  presents  the  main
characteristics  of the 39 distribution companies  covered by the data sample.  Section  3 covers  the
various estimation procedures  among which to pick.  Section 4 explains  the test used to check the
robustness  of the results and discusses the various levels of confidence with which the regulators
can  argue  their  case.  In  particular,  this  section  makes  the  case  for  at  least  a  mild form  of
international yardstick competition between  electricity distribution companies  in South America.
Section 5 concludes.
1.  THE SPECIFICATION  OF THE MODEL
The main challenge  for any regulator is to make the most of the information available.  This
basic,  quite  obvious,  observation  has  already  been  internalized  by  most  applied  economists
working on efficiency measures  for electricity companies.  This means that pragmatism will often
rule over strict theory. While  the theory  would  argue for a detailed  structural model  accounting
for all possible factors, pragmatism  implies that the best one can hope to achieve  in practice is to
estimate a single equation production function.5
The estimation of a cost function (a valid alternative3) involves an assumption about firms'
behavior, namely profit maxiniization.  However,  whenever  there is public ownership,  the firms,
in general,  will not seek profit maximization as their main goal.  As Pestieau  and Tulkens  (1990)
argue,  public  enterprises  do  not  share  the  same  objectives  and  constraints  as  their  private
counterparts,  so their relative performance  should only be compared on the basis of a production
relationship  which  serves  as  a  common  ground.  Moreover,  the  estimation  of  cost  frontiers
involves  the  utilization  of variables  measured  in  monetary  units,  which  could  be  a  serious
problem  if one wishes  to  make  international  comparisons.  Production  functions,  instead,  only
require variables measured in physical units (i.e. homogeneous among countries -or at least much
more homogeneous).  Given  that we are estimating  an international  frontier and that the  sample
includes private and public firms as well, we choose to estimate a production function.
Having decided upon the relationship  to be estimated,  we still have  to make a decision over
the variables that should be included in the analysis. What  are the outputs of the industry? What
are the inputs? Are there variables beyond the firms'  control?
The first issue is to  decide which  output to focus on.  According to Neuberg  (1977), both
number of customers  served  and total energy sold qualify as potential  outputs  in this sector.  In
order to decide between them, some regulatory insights must be taken into account.  In particular,
it is important to note that energy delivered to final customers  is not really exogenous,  especially
in  non-regulated  public  utilities.  That  is,  the  utility  is  not  always  compelled  to  provide  its
customers  with  whatever  quantities  they  desire  at  given  prices.  Number  of customers,  on  the
other  hand,  cannot  be  controlled  by  utilities  since  in  general  everybody  has  the  right  to  be
connected  to the local distributor.  Therefore, energy delivered is a better output  measure  for the
production function specification.
3  Just to name to two most common relationships that are estimated.6
The next challenge  is identifying the inputs. The number of employees  is the standard labor
input and is easily obtained. As for the capital inputs, the options are more complex. Transformer
capacity  is  widely  accepted  as  a required  variable.  However,  kilometers  of distribution  lines,
which  measures  the  amount  of capital  in the  form  of network,  can  be  misleading  since  it can
reflect  geographical  dispersion  of consumers  rather  than  differences  in  productive  efficiency
(Kumbhakar  and  Hjalmarsson,  1998).  Therefore,  in  a  study  of relative  efficiency  differences,
network  capital  can  either  be  treated  as  an  output  or  as  input  but  only  after  controlling  for
geographical  dispersion.  In  this  paper  we  adopt  the  second  position  and  hence  correct
appropriately by accounting for consumer density.
Regarding the environmental  variables (variables  beyond the firms' control)  to be included
in the model4, service  area is unambiguously  an exogenous  operating  characteristic  of the firm's
environment.  As we argue above,  the number of customers  served  and their distribution is also
exogenous, so we include  not only  service  area as a control variable,  but also customer density.
The idea is that customer density  should capture  the effect of demographic  features,  in the sense
that higher values of this variable can be expected to enable a firm to deliver more output per unit
of input.  For  similar  reasons,  we  need to  measure  the  effect  of delivering  energy  at  different
voltages required by different customers,  and therefore  we include the proportion  of total energy
delivered  that  is  distributed  to  residential  customers  as  an  additional  operating  characteristic.
Finally, the variable GNP per capita is included to control for differences  in the socio-economic
environment in which firms operate in each country.
4  Introducing  environmental  variables in  the  production  function  specification  assumes  that  these  variables  affect
technology  rather  than  computed  efficiency  scores,  and  generates  net  efficiency  measures.  See  the  discussion  in
Section 3.7
The particular choice  of variables  made  here  follows  the  general  consensus  found in  the
current  literature.  We  review  this  literature  in  the  Appendix.  Although  comparison  of some
alternative  modeling  could  yield  additional  insights,  we  believe  that  the  model  chosen  is
reasonably  general  in terms  of the  current  literature  and that the  motivation  for  the choice  of
variables is rather convincing.
In many cases there are good reasons why some firms do not follow an efficient pattern,  but
once  the  regulators  have  done  this  initial  sorting  out,  the  burden  of proof  should  be  on  the
regulated companies.  That is to say, the initial model used  as  a yardstick  is not so determinant,
since the firms can impugn the proposed model until every part (fimns and regulators) agree about
the  final model  -involving  themselves  in  a "learning  by doing"  iterative  process  in  which both
firms  and regulators  learn  while  playing  the  game  (see Burns  and  Estache  (1998),  Rossi  and
Ruzzier, (2000), Coelli, Estache, Perelman  and Trijillo (2002)).
Following  the  discussion  above  and  the  availability  of data,  the  initial  model  for  the
production function will be:
Initial  Model
Output:  Inputs:  Environmental variables:
1. Total sales  1. Number of employees  1. Service area
2. Distribution network  2. Customer density
3. Transformer capacity  3. Demand structure
4. GNP per capita
The  final  model  will  be  obtained  after  testing  the  statistical  significance  of  the
environmental  variables.  The idea is that a frontier model has two parts: the "core" of the model
and the environmental  variables (Rossi and Ruzzier, 2000). In a production function  approach the8
(theoretically  determined)  core  is  formed  by  the  inputs,  whereas  the  set  of  environmental
variables includes those factors  that might influence the firms'  perfornance  and  are not directly
controllable by them. The initial specification  for the core of the model is subject  to theoretical
considerations.  Environmental  variables, on the other hand, are not theoretically  determiined  and
will only be included in the final model if they are statistically and economically  significant.
2.  THE DATABASE
The  sample  accounts  for  39  electricity  distribution  companies  (23  private,  16  public)
spread over  10 countries.  It is representative  of the sector in the region and covers: Argentina  (8
firms, including the two largest firms  in terms  of number of customers),  Bolivia (2), Brazil  (2),
Chile  (2),  Colombia (2), Ecuador  (4),  Paraguay  (1), Peru  (12),  Uruguay  (1) and Venezuela  (5),
for  the  period  1994-2000.  The  only  missing  countries  are  the  Guyana,  French  Guyana  and
Suriname.  The  Brazilian  sector  is probably  underrepresented  since  we only  have  data  on two
firms, including the second largest one.  Some details are provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Firms, Countries and Ownership
Country  Number of firms covered by the
sample
Argentina  5  private, 3 public
Bolivia  1 private,  I public
Brazil  2 public
Chile  2 private
Colombia  2 public
Ecuador  3  private,  I public
Paraguay  'I public
Peru  8  private, 4 public
Uruguay  I public
Venezuela  4 private, I public9
Firim  data was collected  from several  sources.  Data for the period  1994-1999  was mostly
compiled from CEER (Comisi6n de Integraci6n Electrica Regional - Regional Electric Integration
Commission)  reports,  "Datos Estadisticos.  Empresas  Electricas.  Afno  1994",  "Datos Estadfsticos.
Empresas  Electricas.  Afios  1995-1996-1997",  "Informaci6n Econ6mica  y Tecnica de Empresas
El6ctricas.  Datos  1998-1999".  Data  for  Peru  was  partly  compiled  from  CTE  (commission  in
charge  of energy  tariffs),  and  data  for  Argentina  in  the  year  2000  was  partly  provided  by
ADEERA (an association of distribution  companies). For the most recent data, we relied directly
on firms. When possible, the data was cross-checked  and completed using firms'  balance sheets
(or firms'  web pages), and information provided by regulators  and governmental agencies.
When  a  particular  piece  of  information  was  missing,  in  order  not  to  lose  the  entire
observation,  some algorithm was used  to  fill the  gap.  After eliminating utilities  for which  data
quality  was  insufficient,  we  obtained  an  unbalanced  panel  with  194  observations  from the 39
firms  in the  period  1994-2000.  We  only  included in  our panel  firms for which  we had at least
three consecutive  observations.
The following variables  are going to be used in the estimations:  sales (in GWh, calculated
as total sales minus sales to other electric companies, in order to isolate the distribution activity in
the case of integrated  firms),  number  of employees  (in  vertical  integrated  fimns  we  use  only
employees  in  the  distribution  activity,  as  informed  by  the  firms),  total  distribution  lines  (in
kilometers),  total  transformer  capacity  (in kVA),  service  area (in square kilometers),  residential
sales' share (a proxy for demand structure),  customer density in the service area (in customers per
square kilometer), and GNP per capita (in purchasing power parity units, PPP).
The PPP estimates  of GNP  per capita  for the  period  1994-1998  were  obtained  from  the
World  Development  Reports  1996-2000.  We  used  PPP  figures  in  order  to  correct  for
international  differences in relative prices (for details, see World Development Reports technical10
notes).  The figures  for the years  1999  and 2000 were  calculated using the World  Development
Indicators database from the World Bank. The summary statistics are presented in Table 2. In all
cases the sample size is equal to 194 observations.
Table 2: Su  Statistics
Variable  Sample  Sample  Minimum  Maximum
Mean  Standard
. Deviation
Sales (in GWh)  3566  6944  31  37777
Distribution Lines (in km)  21103  55404  443  316997
Number of Employees  1518  2541  26  12239
Transformer Capacity (in kVA)  1440  2207  16  9986
Service Area (in kin)  77878  159682  59  823700
Customer Density  117  203  0.31  677
(in customers per kmn)
Residential Sales / Sales (in %)  42  9  17  63
GNP per capita (in PPP units)  6568  2590  2400  13091
3.  THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
To provide  a full assessment of the potential value of the information available,  we cover as
wide  a spectrum of approaches  regulators  could  adopt with  the  data available  as  possible.  We
present  both  econometric  and  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  estimates  to  assess  the
efficiency  performance of South America's electricity distribution companies.  More specifically,
we test two parametric  models, a stochastic frontier estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML)  and
a random effects model  estimated by Feasible Generalized Least  Squares  (FGLS), and two non-
parametric  DEA (one with variable returns to scale and another with constant returns to scale).
3.1. The econometic models
We define the general stochastic frontier production function model by
In Y, = f  (Xi,, t;,l3) + ei, ,
where  Y,,  denotes  output, Xi,  is  a  matrix  of  inputs,  t  represents  time,  ,B are  technological
parameters  to  be  estimated,  and  f  is  some  appropriate  functional  form.  The  error  term  isit
-i=  vi,  - Ui,,  where  vi,  are assumed independent  and identically distributed random errors which
have normal distribution  with mean  zero  and unknown  variance,  i,,,  and  ui,  are non-negative
random  variables  which  represent  technical  inefficiency.  The  Battese  and  Coelli  (1992)
representation  (ui, = exp [-q  (t - T)] u;) is used for the technical inefficiency term.
The time term is included to account  for technical  change.  Representing  technical change
by including a time term in the production frontier may seem relatively innocuous but it is in fact
a  very  strong assumption  and is  not always  realistic.  Many  innovations  and developments  that
one  would  like  to  subsume  under the  rubric  of technical  change  are not  consistent  with  this
formulation, which assumes that technical change does not require new inputs and further that the
production  frontier maintains  the  same basic  form  as  time elapses.  However,  as  many  authors
point  out, including a time term in production frontiers  may not be perfect, but it is a workable
alternative  with  some  definitive  advantages  (i.e.,  analytical  and  econometric  tractability)  over
some other approaches.5
The translogarithmic  (or translog) and  the Cobb-Douglas  production functions  are the two
most  common  functional  forms  which  have  been  used  in  empirical  studies  on  production,
including  frontier analyses.  The translog  is a flexible  function,  since it is a second-order  Taylor
approximation  (in logarithms) to any smooth, continuous function. The Cobb-Douglas production
frontier is a special  case  of the  translog in which  the coefficients  of the  second order terms are
zero.
5  Different  null hypothesis  associated  with technical change  are analyzed in Rossi (2002).  The results show that non
neutral  technical  change  models  or  models  with  quadratic  time  trend  do  not  differ  significantly  from  the  more
parsimonious  model present here. Therefore, in our preferred model we include only a linear time trend.12
In  this  paper  the  most  general  functional  form  for  the  stochastic  frontier  for  electricity
distribution in South America is a translog production  function:
In Y1,  = Ao + Xii,A  + X2i,f 2 + X  +  +  lA  + X3
2J 33 + X,i,X2i,A2
+Xl,ix 3 itAf3 + X2itX3 iJt? 23 + tA?  + Vj  - Ui
where Y indicates  sales, XI  is the natural logarithm of the number of permanent employees,  X2 is
the  natural  logarithm of  distribution  network,  and  X3 is  the  natural  logarithm  of transformer
capacity.
The production  function above does not include enviromnental  variables.  Coelli,  Perelman
and Romano  (1999) suggest that the literature offers two alternative  approaches to their inclusion.
One assumes that the environmental  factors influence the shape of the technology  and hence that
these factors  should be included  directly  into the  production  functions  as  regressors,  while  the
other assumes  that they directly  influence  the degree of technical  inefficiency.  In  this study  we
adopt the position of including them as regressors in order to get efficiency  measures that are net
of environmental  influences.  As pointed out by Coelli, Perelman and Romano  (1999), measuring
net efficiency is an important  issue as it allows one to predict how companies would be ranked if
they were able to operate in equivalent environments.
Therefore,  the most general function  to be estimated is as in equation  (1) but including four
additional environmental  variables:
ln Y1,  = flo + Xii,Af  + X 20i2 + XA3j,3  + Xl,/3 1 + X2,,l  +3i3  + XutX 2J,t2
1i,X3j,itA3 + X21,X3 Nf6 23 + tA +  AIflAI + A2 8A 2 + A3IA 3 + A4f8A 4 + Vit  -ui
where  A, is the natural  logarithm of demand  structure,  A2 is the natural  logarithm of customer
density,  A3 is the natural  logarithm of service area,  A4 and  is the natural logarithm of GNP per
capita.13
As it is now usual in this  literature,  we use the parameterization  proposed by Battese  and
Corra  (1977)',  which uses  y =  2/(a)2+cr2)  The program  FRONTIER  4.1,  developed  by T.
Coelli (1996),  is used for the estimations.
In this paper we take advantage  of the great  flexibility  of this model  and we  test the half-
normal  distribution  hypothesis  vis  a  vis  the  more  general  truncated  normal  distribution
(Ho : u = 0), and we also contrast the hypothesis that the efficiency is time invariant  (Ho:  0 = 0) .
Finally,  we test  the null hypothesis  that there  are  no technical  inefficiency  effects  in the model;
H 0 :y=0. As  suggested  by  Coelli  (1996),  these  alternative  models  are  estimated  and  the
preferred  models  are  selected  using  a Likelihood  Ratio (LR)  test.  This  test  is based  on  the Log
Likelihood functions as follows:
LR = -2[LR-  Lu],
where  LR  is  the  Log  Likelihood  of the  restricted  model  and  Lu  is  the  Log  Likelihood  of the
unrestricted  model.  Asymptotically,  the LR statistic  has a chi-square distribution  with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of restrictions  involved.6
The  ML  estimates  of  the  parameters  in  the  unrestricted  translog  stochastic  frontier
production  function (called Model  1) are shown in Table 4. Formal tests of hypothesis associated
to  Model  1  are  given  in  Table  3.  The  first  null
hypothesis, Ho :,811 = fl22 = 1633 = A 2 = /13 = 423 = 0,  that  the  Cobb-Douglas  is  an  adequate
representation of the technology is rejected by the data. The second hypothesis,  Ho: y = 0, which
6 It must be  noted that in the case  where the null  includes the restriction that  y = 0  (a point on the boundary of the
parameter  space),  the  likelihood  ratio  statistics  will  have  asymptotic  distribution  equal  to  a mixture  of chi-square
distributions  - + - (Coelli  1993, Lee  1993).
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specifies that firms are fully efficient is strongly rejected.  The null that the inefficiency has a half-
normal  distribution,  H.  ,  =0,  cannot be  rejected  by the  data,  and  therefore in  our preferred
model  we  work  assuming  a  half-normal  distribution  for  the  inefficiency  terms.  The  null
hypothesis that the technical inefficiency is time invariant,  Ho: q = 0,  cannot be rejected. Finally
we  test  the  significance  of  the  environmental  variables.  The  null  hypothesis
Ho: 
1 A1  = PA2  =  flA3  =  I6A4  =  0  is  strongly  rejected  by  the  data,  suggesting  that environmental
variables cannot be omitted in the estimation of production frontiers in this kind of sector. A fact
which would probably argued  for by most operators.
Table 3: Likelihood Ratio Tests
Null Hypothesis  Log Likelihood  X2  value  Test statistic*
Given Model 1  167.00  _
Ho:  __=  _  _2  =  _33_=_2  =  _=23  =  °  155.79  12.59  22.41*
Ho:rY = °  17.40  6.25  299.21*
Ho  pU = 0  166.66  3.84  0.67
Ho:  = 0  166.98  3.84  0.03
Ho:  flAl  =  PA2  =  PA3  =  flA4 =  0  117.27  9.49  99.46*
*An asterisk on the value of the test statistic indicates that it exceeds the 99'  percentile  for the corresponding
X2 distribution and so the null hypothesis is rejected.
The  above  tests  suggest  that  the  preferred  model  (we  call  it  Model  IP)  is  a translog
stochastic  production  function  with  neutral  technical  change  and  time-invariant  inefficiency,
which  is  assumed  distributed  as  a  half-normal.  The  production  function  includes  demand
structure, customer density, service area and GNP per capita as environmental  variables.
Since we cannot reject the hypothesis of constant technical efficiency, we can run Model  IP
as  a random effects  model (we call it Model  IG).  The ML  estimates of the unrestricted  model
(Model  1)  and  the  preferred  model  (Model  IP),  and  FGLS  estimates  of the  preferred  model
(Model  IG) are shown in Table 4.15
Table 4: Econometric Results
Variable  Model 1  Standard  Model 1P  Standard  Model iG  Standard
Errors  Errors  Errors
Constant  -4.861  1.393  -5.914  1.205  -5.223  1.550
Ln Employee  -0.386  0.219  -0.388  0.211  -0.346  0.240
Ln Net  0.328  0.288  0.171  0.269  0.210  0.323
Ln Capacity  0.162  0.230  0.357  0.220  0.179  0.265
(In Employee)  0.029  0.025  0.043  0.023  0.014  0.026
(In Net)  -0.012  0.022  0.001  0.023  -0.011  0.026
(In Capacity)'  0.156  0.030  0.156  0.032  0.145  0.032
Ln Employee x In Net  0.095  0.034  0.091  0.031  0.102  0.039
Ln Employee x In
Capacity  -0.129  0.047  -0.146  0.047  -0.118  0.054
Ln Net x In Capacity  -0.108  0.036  -0.120  0.035  -0.102  0.039
Ln Demand Structure  -0.517  0.061  -0.511  0.060  -0.536  0.064
Ln Customer Density  0.725  0.091  0.763  0.065  0.781  0.082
Ln Service Area  0.695  0.086  0.726  0.059  0.744  0.086
Ln GNP per capita  0.105  0.091  0.180  0.072  0.057  0.092
Time  0.016  0.009  0.013  0.005  0.014  0.005
. 0.982  0.013  0.987  0.005
P  0.495  0.157
77  -0.003  0.013  _
Average Efficiency  0.578  0.657  0.564
Since  the  coefficients  of  the  translog  production  functions  do  not  have  any  direct
interpretation,  we  calculate  the  elasticities  of  output  with  respect  to  each  of  the  inputs
corresponding to models above
3ya
EL  e  =  =,lk + 2,8kXu, +  E  p8k X jj,,  k = 1,  2, 3;j = 1,  2,3 .
In general, returns to scale is calculated from the sum of the input elasticities as
RTS =  E  E4.
k
However,  it  is  sometimes  noted  that  when  the model  includes  environmental  variables
related to scale  (such  as service area),  the scale elasticity is given by the proportionate effect  on
production of changes in the input variables and these environmental variables.  The main point is
that changing the scale of a firm would involve changing  not only the inputs but also all of these
characteristics  (Burns and Weyman-Jones,  1994). Given customer density,  demand structure and16
the socio-economic  conditions, returns to scale should be defined  as relating  the change in output
to a change in all inputs and service area. That is,
RTS = E ELk  + 1A3-
k
The following table  shows  input elasticities,  service area elasticity  and returns  to scale  for
both preferred  models, Model  IP and  Model  1G.  Input elasticities  are  calculated  at the  sample
means values (the Taylor series expansion points).
Table 5: Elasticities and Returns to Scale
Elasticity  with respect to
Model  Employees  KM of  Transformer  Service Area  Returns to
network  Capacity  scale
Model  1P  0.08  -0.01  0.36  0.73  1.15*
Model  IG  0.02  -0.01  0.40  0.74  1.16*
*Reject the null of constant returns to scale at a 5% level.
Elasticities  with  respect  to  service  area  and  transformer  capacity  are  positive  and  quite
comparable  across models. However,  we cannot reject  the null that labor and network elasticity
are equal to zero in both models. As expected,  in both models  returns  to scale  are significantly
greater than one.
The  estimated  coefficients  of the  environmental  variables  have  the  expected  signs.  The
negative  influence  of demand structure  implies that firms with a lower proportion  of residential
customers benefit from a more favorable environment  and hence perform better when no attempt
is  made to  take into  account this  advantage.  Customer  density  has  a positive  effect  on output,
which means that as the number of customers per square kilometer rises (ceteris paribus),  energy
delivered  will consequently  go up.  Service  area has  also  a  positive  sign,  since  given  customer
density it is playing an input role. Finally, the positive coefficient of GNP per capita suggests that
firms  operating  in  countries  with  high  GNP  per  capita  benefit  from  a  more  favorable  socio-
economic environment.17
The  annual  rate of technical change  is  1.3  percent in Model  IP and  1.4  percent  in Model
1G.  Finally,  average  efficiency  is  around  66  percent  in  Model  IP, and  around  56  percent  in
Model 1G. These results suggest that there is scope for efficiency improving for the average  firm
in the sample.
3.2. The DEA estimates
In order to allow for the comparison  of the results,  we used  the same model  as in the last
section to perform the nonparametric  estimation,  i.e. we have a model with only one output (total
-sales),  three  inputs  (labor,  km  of  distribution  lines  and  transformer  capacity),  and  four
environmental  variables  (service  area, customer  density in the service  area,  a proxy for demand
structure  and  GNP per  capita).  The  orientation  chosen  is  to  the  proportional  augmentation  in
output achievable  by a firm while  maintaining  the level of inputs, for this is consistent with the
interpretation of the econometric  results.
There  exist  basically  two  alternative  assumptions  about  the  returns  to  scale:  constant
returns to scale (DEA-C) and variable returns to scale  (DEA-V). The theoretical  specification  of
the DEA-C model consists in an optimization problem subject to constraints, like the following:
max A
s.to  Au<zU,zX <x,zE<e,zeR.
This problem gives  as  a solution  the proportion  (A) in which  the  observed outputs  of the
firm being analyzed could be expanded if the firm were efficient.  U is a n*r matrix of outputs of
the firms in the sample (n denoting the number of firms and r the number of outputs). X is a n*m
matrix of inputs of the saniple firms (m indexing considered inputs). E is a n**s matrix containing
all the information  about  s environmental  variables  of the n firms.  u, x and  e  are the  observed
output,  input  and  environmental  variables  vectors,  respectively,  of the  firm  under  evaluation.18
Finally, z is a vector of intensity parameters  (zi,  Z2,  ..., Zn) that allows for the convex combination
of the observed inputs and outputs (in order to build the envelopment surface).
To obtain the second model, DEA-V, it suffices  to add the following constraint to the above
problem (Seiford and Thrall, 1990):
n
z;=1. ziI
Though  model  DEA-V  would  be  a  desirable  choice,  since  it  does not  restrict  returns  to
scale  to be  constant  (hypothesis  rejected  in  the econometric  setting),  we  nevertheless  compute
also model DEA-C, given that quite often in the case of models with variable returns to scale the
smallest and low-productive  units  (in terms of partial productivities)  show  up as  fully efficient
just  because  they  lack  comparators.  We  chose  to  model  environmental  variables  as  non-
discretionary inputs (see Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese,  1998). In this fashion, each firm is only
evaluated  against  a hypothetical  firm which has an environment (which cannot be altered by the
firm)  that  is  not better  than  that of the  firm  under evaluation.  As  a  drawback,  this  modeling
choice implies an  a priori judgment on the direction of influence  of each environmental  variable
upon efficiency. This judgment was made on the basis of the econometric results shown in Table
4.7
Since  we  have panel  data,  several  possibilities  arise  within the  context  of DEA.  One  of
them is to compute  a frontier for each period (seven cross-section  analyses)  and to compare these
cross-sectional  runs.  In  this  way,  one  constructs  a  frontier  in  each  year  and  calculate  the
efficiency  of each firm relative to the  frontier in each  period.  Another possibility is to treat the
panel  as  a  single  cross-section  (each  firm  in  each  period being  considered  as  an  independent
7 Since one variable (demand structure)  has a negative impact on production, we inverted it prior to inclusion, instead
of treating the variable as a non-discretionary  "output". See Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese (1998).19
observation),  pooling  the  observations  altogether.  Under  this  approach,  a  single  frontier  is
computed, and the relative efficiency of each firm in each period is calculated by reference  to this
single frontier. An intermediate  alternative  would be the window analysis  approach  proposed by
Charnes et al.  (1985).8  The  choice of width for the  windows  poses  an additional  complication,
since  it is entirely  ad hoc,  and  "currently  determined  by trial and  error"  (Charnes  et  al.,  1994,
p.60).  In  this  study,  we  try  treating  the  panel  as  a  single  cross-section  under  two  different
assumptions concerning returns to scale -variable (Model DEA-V)  and constant (Model DEA-C),
and calculate averages of the efficiency scores of each firm.9
4.  CONSISTENCY  OF THE RESULTS
To ensure comparability between the various approaches, the four techniques  used the same
efficiency concept (technical efficiency),  the same sample of firms (unbalanced panel of 39 firms
for  the  period  1994-2000,  194  observations),  equal  specifications  of  inputs  (employees,
kilometers  of distribution  lines and transformer  capacity),  environmental  variables (service  area,
customer density, demand structure and GNP per capita) and output (total sales).
Section 3 made it clear that the main problem faced by regulators willing  to apply frontier
studies  is the  variety  of options  at  hand.  The  problem  is  particularly  serious  if the  different
approaches  give  mutually  inconsistent  results.  In  an  attempt to  establish  the conditions  under
which  frontier  methodologies  are  most  useful  to  regulatory  authorities,  Bauer  et  al.  (1998)
propose  a  set  of  consistency  conditions  which,  if  met,  would  avoid  the  choice  between
8 The first two possibilities can  be thought of as special cases of the window analysis: in the first case,  window width
is equal to 1, and in the second, it is equal to the total number of periods.
9 We  programmed  the  optimization  problem  in  GAMS  Version  1.0.4,  and  used  the  MINOS5  solver  for  the
computations.20
approaches.  The efficiency  measures  generated  by the different  techniques  should  show internal
and external  consistency;  they  should  (i)  be  consistent  in  their efficiency  levels,  rankings  and
identification of the best and the worst performers, and (ii) be consistent over time.
Broadly  speaking,  the  first  conditions  determine  the  degree  to  which  the  different
approaches  are  mutually  consistent  (internal  consistency),  whereas  the  remaining  condition
establishes  the  degree  to  which  the  different  efficiency  measures  are  consistent  with  reality
(external  consistency).  The  first  conditions  say if the  different  approaches  will  give  the  same
answers to the regulators,  while the last condition says if it is likely that these answers  are correct.
To see what this means  in practice,  we focus on its implication in the context of price cap
regulation. The main purpose of a switch from rate of return regulation to price cap regulation has
been to increase the incentive for firms to minimize their costs and to ensure that eventually users
will benefit from these reductions  in costs-typically  within 3-5  years after a regulatory review.
The adoption  of price cap regulation  is one of the main reasons for this increase in the efforts to
measure efficiency  in regulated  sectors.  Indeed  the observed  cost reductions would be associated
with efficiency  gains,  which have  to be measured.  Efficiency measures are no longer a sideshow
as they were under rate of return regulation.
The  initial  regulatory  challenge  at  the  time  of  a  price  review  is  the  following.  If the
productivity  gain  used  to  assess  the  new  price  cap  is  specific  to the  firm  and  based  on  gains
achieved by this firm in the past, this firm will not have strong incentives to improve efficiency to
cut costs because this would result in a lower price cap. An alternative  for the regulator would be
to measure  efficiency  gains by relying on factors  that are not under the  control of the regulated
firm.  But in that situation, if the regulator  has very little knowledge of the past costs of the firm
and bases its measure of efficiency gain on, for instance, the productivity gains  in a related  sector
in the economy,  some perverse effects  may penalize  the firm.  This is why the suggestion  to rely21
on yardstick  competition  should be so tempting  for regulators.  Price can  be  set for an industry
based  on the  aggregate  industry performance.  For instance,  the price  cap  can be  based  on the
average unit cost in the industry rather than on the firm specific  average unit cost and this gives a
strong incentive to the firm to have a unit cost below average.  In this context, efficiency measures
are  inputs  in  the  regulatory  rnechanism  in  an even  more  direct  way  than  under  rate  of return
regulation.
If a firm has an efficiency  index of 0.8 for instance, it means  that it could produce the same
level of output at 80% of its current costs (cost function approach)  or produce  the same level of
output using an  80% of its current inputs (production function approach).  This means that the cap
should be based on 80% of current cost, not  100%. With this  approach,  only the  firms reaching
100% of efficiency would be allowed to recover their opportunity cost of capital while  the others
would have lower rates of return.
The implementation  of such  a mechanism,  however,  requires  that at the minimum the first
consistency condition is met (consistency in efficiency levels).  If this is not met,  this mechanism
should not be applied since the individual efficiency  measures would be somewhat subjective and
hence  unreliable.  Table  6 presents  the main characteristics  of the distributions  generated by the
four methodologies tested.
The Kruskal-Wallis  (nonparametric)  test was carried out to contrast  the null hypothesis that
the four techniques generate  the  same distribution of efficiency  scores,  and we do reject the null
at a level of significance of 1%.10 That is, this consistency condition is not met. This result is not
particular  to  our  sample,  but  rather  general  in  the  applied  literature,  and  it  could  help  in
10 We used EViews Version 3.0 to perform the test.22
explaining why regulators  tend not to translate  efficiency measures  one-for-one  into X factors or
expected cost reductions.
Table 6: Comparison of the Distributions of  ciency  Measures Across  Methods
Approach  ML  FGLS  DEA-V  DEA-C
Mean  0.657  0.564  0.966  0.873
Median  0.659  0.567  0.998  0.929
Deviation  0.194  0.195  0.080  0.153
Maximum  0.978  1.000  1.000  1.000
Minimum  0.327  0.258  0.594  0.490
Sample  39  39  39  39
If  the  levels  of  efficiency  are  not  consistent  across  the  different  methods  of  frontier
estimation,  it  is  still  possible  that  these  methods  generate  similar rankings  of firms  by  their
efficiency  scores.  Identifying  the  ranking  would  help  to discriminate  the  X  factor among  the
firms in the sector.
Table  7  shows  Spearman's  ranking  correlation  between  pairs  of  techniques."'  All  the
correlations  between pairs of approaches  are positive and significantly different from zero at the
usual levels  of confidence  (the null hypothesis of zero correlation  is rejected).  The  correlations
are  particularly  high  between  nonparametric  models  (Spearman's  ranking  correlation  between
DEA-V  and  DEA-C  is  0.723,  which  is  significantly  different  from zero  at  1%)  and  between
parametric techniques (Spearman's  ranking correlation between ML and FGLS is 0.943, which is
also significantly  different  from zero).  Therefore,  there  is  evidence  that the  methodologies  are
consistent under this condition.
Table 7: Spearman's Rankin  Correlation Between  Pairs of Techniques
Approach  ML  FGLS  DEA-V  DEA-C
ML  1.000  0.943  0.340  0.582
FGLS  1.000  0.345  0.539
DEA-V  1.000  0.723
DEA-C  1.000
"  We used Intercooled Stata 7.0 for Windows 98/95/NT to compute the correlations.23
If consistency  in efficiency  levels and rankings  is not met,  but consistency  in  identifying
best and worst performers is, it would still be possible to discriminate  the X factor among groups
of firms in the sector.  Indeed,  identifying the rough ordering of firms is usually more important
for regulatory policy decisions  than measuring the level of efficiency  or the efficiency rankings.
The upper  triangle of the  matrix  displayed  in Table  8 shows,  for each  pair  of techniques,  the
fraction  of firms that both  simultaneously  classified  in the upper quartile  (10 firms).  The lower
triangle of the matrix shows the same for the case of the lower quartile (10 firms).1 2
Table 8: Consistency in Identifying Best and Worst Performers
Approach  FGLS  DEA-V  DEA-C
FGLS  0.90_-'
DEA-V  0.50  J  0.50
DEA-C  0.70  |  0.70  0.50
Overall, these results appear to imply that the top and bottom performers can reasonably be
identified by  any of the methods  and  hence  the  third condition  for robustness  of the results  is
being  met. The  advantage  of knowing  if the  different  approaches  are consistent  in identifying
"best"  or  "worst"  firms  is  that,  even  if the  first  two consistency  test  fail,  a  "mild"  form  of
benchmark regulation  can be  relied  on. This is  somehow  what the  water regulator for England
and Wales does when it publishes the efficiency rankings in the media to increase public pressure
on the regulated companies. The idea is to inform the users and allow them to compare prices and
services across regions  and give them an instrument to put pressure on their own operator if it is
not perforning well.
12 It is worth mentioning that if these fractions were purely random, they would be expected to be around 25%.24
We now turn to external consistency and determine the year-to-year  stability of DEA-V and
DEA-C  efficiency estimates  over time. We  do not include the,econometric  approaches  because
we tested whether efficiency  was constant over time  and were not able to reject this hypothesis.
We  calculated  the correlations  for the  time-varying  efficiency  measures  between  each  pair  of
years.  That  is,  for  both  DEA  models,  we  computed  the  correlation  between  DEA  efficiency
measures in year i, i = 1994,  ..., 1999, and the efficiency  scores in year j, j = 1995,  ... , 2000, with
j > i to avoid redundancy.  Table 9 presents the average correlations by the number of years apart.
In general,  the n-year apart figures are averages of the 7-n correlations  between efficiencies  that
are n years away from each other.
Table 9: Correlations Between  DEA Efficiency  Measures
Approach  1 year apart  2 year apart  3 year apart  4 year apart  5 year apart  6 year apart
DEA-V  0.836  0.647  0.564  0.536  0.639  0.629
DEA-C  0.750  0.607  0.574  0.677  0.865  0.702
The correlations are high and statistically significant  over all the available  lags, suggesting
that  the  efficiency  scores  of the  DEA-V  and DEA-C  models  are  stable over  time  and  giving
additional support to the result of no efficiency  change  obtained with the parametric  techniques
used here.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
The  most  important  result  of this  paper  has  been  to  show  that  yardstick  or benchmark
competition organized around measures of technical efficiency is possible, at least in a mild form.
This  is not to say that the operators will not complain  and question  not only the results but also
the methodologies.  But this is normal. Regulation amounts  to a game played between regulators
and operators, most of the time, with the purpose of allocating the rent generated by the regulated25
monopolistic  business between  operators,  users  and  the government.  Too  often in the  past the
game has been biased in favor of firms since they control much of the information.  This implies
that too often the efficiency gains actually achieved through restructuring and competition for the
market have not been shared with the final users.
This approach  levels  the playing field by providing the regulator in each country  with an
instrument that reduces  the information asymmetry. By allowing the regulator to propose its own
estimate of the rent to be distributed based on the best practice  defined by the performance of the
top  5  or  10  firms,  the  approach  proposed  here  forces  the  regulated  firms  unhappy  with  the
regulator's  assessment to reveal more information than it otherwise would.
A necessary condition  for this form of competition to work is for regulators  to coordinate
with the  other regulators in the region  in a much more  focused way than  they have done in the
past.  For  this  sector  and  for  most  countries,  the  performance  comparison  can  only  be
international.  The more comparable across countries  the information  is, the more effective  is this
form of competition and the easier it is for each individual regulator to rely on useful results in its
own regulatory  settings.26
APPENDIX
The applied  literature  is  a  good  starting point in  the  identification  of the  variables  to  be
included in the model. In the following table we summarize previous works found in the applied
literature,  highlighting  the  specification  used  (cost  vs.  production),  the  estimation  technique
(econometrics  vs.  mathematical  programming),  the  outputs,  the  inputs  and  the environmental
variables chosen.
Table A.1
Summary of Previous  Studies
Author/s  Specification/  Output/s  Inputs?3 Environmental Variables
____  ___  ___  Estimation
Neuberg,  Cost function,  Customers  Capital, labor  MWh sold, KM of
1977  Econometrics  distribution line, service area
Huettner and  Cost function,  Total capacity,  Labor  Line transformers per
Landon,  1977  Econometrics  average demand  customer, residential,
as a ratio of  commercial and industrial
maximum  sales per customer, and a set
capacity  of dummy variables
Roberts,  Cost function,  High and low  KWh input, capital
1986  Econometrics  voltage  (transmission and
deliveries,  distribution), labor
serviced area,
customers
Nelson  and  Cost function,  Number of  Lines,  Labor  City size, a dummy variable
Primeaux,  Econometrics  customers  for the nature of the
1988  competitive environment
New Zealand  Cost function,  Electricity  Labor, capital, electricity
Ministry of  Econometrics  distributed  purchased and "other"
Energy,  1989
Weyman-  Production  Residential,  Labor, mains
Jones,  1991  approach,  commercial  and  distribution
DEA  industrial sales
Weyman-  Production  Residential,  Labor, network size,
Jones, 1992  approach,  commercial and  transformer capacity
DEA  industrial sales,
maximum
demand
Weyman-  Production  Customers  Labor  Network size, transformer
Jones, 1992  approach,  capacity,  total sales,
DEA  maximum demand,
population density, industrial
share in sales
Hjalmarsson  Production  High and low  Labor, high and low
and  approach,  voltage output  voltage  lines,
Veiderpass,  DEA  (MWh), high and  transformer capacity
13 In cost approaches,  inputs prices are used in the models instead of input quantities.27
Author/s  Specificationl  Output/s  Inputsl3  Environmental Variables
Estimation
1992a,b  low voltage
customers
Hougaard,  DEA  Length of power  Labor, operating
1994  lines, total power  expenses, operating
deliveries,  capital, transmission
number of  losses
customers
Salvanes and  Cost function,  GWh produced,  Labor, purchased  Load factor,  topography,
Tj0tta,  1994  econometrics  number of  electricity  climate, dummy rural area
customers
Kittelsen,  DEA  Length of power  Labor, transmission




Bums and  Production  Customers,  Labor, distribution  Consumer density, market
Weyman-  approach,  domestic,  network, transformer  structure




Pollitt,  1995  Cost  function,  Sales per  Labor  % of residential sales,
Econometrics  customer,  ratio  overground and underground
maximum to  distribution circuits,
average demand,  transformer capacity,  service
Customers  area, and a set of dummy
variables
Pollitt, 1995  Production  Customers,  Number of employees,
approach,  residential sales,  transformer capacity,




Bagdadioglu,  DEA  Customers,  Labor, transformer
Waddams  electricity  capacity, network  size,
Price and  supplied,  network losses, general
Weyman-  maximum  expenses
Jones, 1996  demand, service
area
Burns and  Cost function,  Customers  Labor, capital  Maximum  demand, service
Weyman-  Econometrics  area, consumer density, kWh
Jones, 1996  sold, market structure,'4
kilometers of mains line,
transformer capacity
Thompson,  Cost function  High and low  Labor (transmission  and  Service area, number of
1997  voltage sales  distribution), power,  customers
capital (transmission and
distribution plants)
Zhang and  DEA  Total number of  Transformer  capacity,
Bartels,  1998  customers  labor, total km of
I___________  distribution lines
14 Market structure is defined as the share of industrial energy  delivered in total energy delivered.28
Authorls  Specificationl  Output/s  Inputs'
3 Environmental  Variables Estimation
Forsund and  DEA  Distance index,  Labor, energy loss,
Kittelsen,  customers, total  materials, capital
1998  energy delivered
Filippini,  Cost function,  KWh delivered,  Labor, capital,  Load factor, service area
1998  econometrics  number  of  purchased power
______________  customers
Kumbhakar  Production  High and low  Labor, transformer
and  approach,  voltage  capacity,  kilometers of
Hjalmarsson,  DEA and  customers, high  low and high voltage
*1998  Econometrics  and low voltage  lines
energy  sold
Scarsi,  1999  Production  Energy delivered  Labor, kilometers of




Scarsi,  1999  Production  Energy delivered  Labor, kilometers of  Customer density and a set of
function,  to final  distribution lines  dummy variables
econometrics  customers
Scarsi,  1999  Cost function,  GWh sold,  Capital, labor, materials  Customer density, demand
Econometrics  customers  structure, % of third-party
services, % of overhead  low-
voltage lines, % of primary
substations, and a set of
dummy  variables
Kittelsen,  Cost  Energy delivered,  Labor, energy loss,
1999  approach,  customers, line  transformers,  lines,
DEA  length 1-24 kV  goods and services.
DTe, 2000  Cost  Units distributed,  Operating expenditures
efficiency,  small customer







Grifell-Tatje  DEA  Low, medium  Low, medium and high
and Knox  and high voltage  voltage lines, substation





Langset,  DEA  Energy Supplied  Labor, energy losses,
2000  (high and low  capital,  goods and




of lines (by kV)
Jamasb and  Econometrics  Energy delivered,  Controllable operating  Distribution losses, number29
Author/s  Specificationl  Output/s  Inputs3  Environmental Variables
Pollitt, 2001  and DEA, cost  number of  expenditures, capital  of transformers







Filippini and  Cost function,  KWh transported  Labor, capital  Customer structure, load
Wild, 2001  econometrics  on the medium-  factor, customer density,
voltage grid  average consumption,  share
of agricultural, forest and
unproductive land, other
revenues,  dummy high-
voltage30
REFERENCES
Battese,  G.  and  G.  Corra  (1977),  "Estimation  of  a  Production  Frontier  Model:  With
Application  to  the  Pastoral  Zone  of Eastern  Australia."  Australian Journal of Agricultural
Economics 21, 39-56.
Battese,  G. and T. Coelli (1992),  "Frontier Production  Functions, Technical Efficiency  and
Panel  Data:  With  Application  to  Paddy Farmers  in  India."  Journal of Productivity Analysis  3,
153-169.
Bagdadiouglu,  N.,  C.  Waddams  Price  and  T.  Weyman-Jones  (1996),  "Efficiency  and
Ownership  in  Electricity  Distribution:  A  Non-Parametric  Model  of  the  Turkish  Experience."
Energy Economics 18,  1-23.
Bauer,  P.,  A.  Berger,  G.  Ferrier  and D.  Humphrey  (1998),  "Consistency  Conditions  for
Regulatory  Analysis of Financial  Institutions:  A  Comparison  of Frontier Efficiency  Methods."
Journal  of  Economics and Business 50, 85-114.
Bogetoft,  P.  (1997),  "DEA-Based  Yardstick Competition:  The Optimality  of Best Practice
Regulation." Annals of Operations  Research 73, 277-298.
Burns,  P.  and  T.  Weyman-Jones  (1994),  "Regulatory  Incentives,  Privatization,  and
Productivity Growth in UK Electricity Distribution."  CRI Technical Paper  N°l.
Burns, P. and T. Weyman-Jones  (1996),  "Cost Functions and Cost Efficiency in Electricity
Distribution:  A Stochastic Frontier Approach."  Bulletin of  Economic Research 48.
Burns,  P.  and  A.  Estache.  (1998),  "Information,  Accounting  and  the  Regulation  of
Concessioned  Infrastructure  Monopolies",  The  World  Bank,  Policy  Research  Working  Paper
203431
Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper,  A.Y. Lewin,  R.C. Morey  and J. Rousseau  (1985), "Sensitivity
and Stability Analysis in DEA." Annals of Operations  Research  2,  139-156.
Charnes,  A.,  W.W.  Cooper,  A.Y.  Lewin  and  L.M.  Seiford  (1994),  Data Envelopment
Analysis.  Theory,  Methodology  and  Applications.  Kluwer  Academic  Publishers,  Boston/
Dordretch/London.
Coelli,  T.  (1993),  "Finite  Sample  Properties  of  Stochastic  Frontier  estimators  and
Associated  test  Statistics."  Working  Paper  in  Econometrics  and  Applied  Statistics  No.  70,
Department of Econometrics, University of New England, Armindale.
Coelli,  T.  (1996),  "A  Guide  to  FRONTIER  Version  4.1:  A  Computer  Program  for
Stochastic Frontier Production and Cost Function Estimation."  CEPA Working Paper  96/07.
Coelli,  T.,  D.  Prasada  Rao  and  G.  Battese  (1998),  An  Introduction to  Efficiency  and
Productivity  Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Coelli, T., S. Perelman  and E. Romano (1999),  "Accounting  for Environmental  Influences
in  Stochastic  Frontier  Models:  With  Application  to  International  Airlines."  Journal of
Productivity  Analysis 11, 251-273.
Coelli,  T.,  A.  Estache,  S.  Perelman  and  L.  Trujillo  (2002),  A  Primer on  Efficiency
Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators, The  World  Bank  Institute,  Studies  in
Economic Development,  forthcoming.
DTe  (2000),  "Choice  of Model  and  Availability  of Data  for the  Efficiency  Analysis  of
Dutch  Network  and  Supply  Businesses  in  the  Electricity  Sector."  Background  Report,
Netherlands  Electricity Regulatory Service, February 2000.
Estache, A., M. Gonzalez and L. Trujillo (2002),  "Efficiency Gains from Port Reform and
the Potential for Yardstick Competition: Lessons from Mexico." World Development, April, Vol.
30, No. 4.32
Filippini,  M.  (1998),  "Are  Municipal  Electricity  Distribution  Utilities  Natural
Monopolies?" Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 69 (2),  157-174.
Filippini,  M.  and J.  Wild  (2001),  "Regional  Differences  in  Electricity  Distribution  Costs
and their Consequences  for Yardstick  Regulation of Access  Prices." Energy Economics 23,  477-
488.
F0rsund,  F.  and  S.  Kittelsen  (1998),  "Productivity  Development  of Norwegian  Electricity
Distribution Utilities." Resource and Energy Economics 20 (3), 207-224.
Grifell-Tatje,  E.  and  C.  Knox  Lovell  (2000),  "The  Managers  versus  the  Consultants."
Mimeo.
Hjalmarsson,  L.  and  A.  Veiderpass  (1992a),  "Efficiency  and  Ownership  in  Swedish
Electricity Retail Distribution." Journal  of Productivity  Analysis 3, 7-23.
Hjalmarsson,  L.  and  A.  Veiderpass  (1992b),  "Productivity  in  Swedish  Electricity  Retail
Distribution."  Scandinavian  Journal  of Economics 94 (S),  193-205.
Hougaard,  J.  (1994),  "Produktivitetsanlyse  af Dansk  Elproduktion."  AKF-rapport,  AKF
Forlag, Copenhagen.
Huettner,  D.  and  J.  Landon  (1977),  "Electric  Utilities:  Scale  Economies  and
Diseconomies." Southern Economic Journal  44, 883-912.
Jamasb,  T. and M. Pollit (2001), "International  Benchmarking  & Yardstick  Regulation:  An
Application  to  European  Electricity  Distribution  Utilities."  Paper  presented  in  the  Seventh
European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity, Spain, September 2001.
Kittelsen,  S.  (1994),  "Effektivitet  og Regulering  i  Norsk  Elektrisitetsdistribusjon."  SNF-
rapport 3/94, SNF, Oslo.33
Kittelsen,  S. (1999), "Using DEA to Regulate Norwegian Electricity Distribution Utilities."
Presentation  at  the  6h  European  Workshop  on  Efficiency  and  Productivity  Analysis,
Copenhagen.
Kumbhakar,  S.  and  L.  Hjalmarsson  (1998),  "Relative  Performance  of Public  and  Private
Ownership  Under  Yardstick  Competition:  Electricity  Retail Distribution."  European Economic
Review 42, 97-122.
Langset,  T.  (2000),  "Benchmarking  Distribution  Systems."  Paper  presented  in  the
Workshop  on  International  Benchmarking  of Electric  Utilities:  Experiences  and  Information
Requirements,  University of Cambridge.
Lee,  L.  (1993),  "Asymptotic  Distribution  of the  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimator  for  a
Stochastic Frontier Function Model with a Singular Information  Matrix." Econometric Theory 9,
413-430.
Nelson, R.  and W. Primeaux  Jr.  (1988), "The Effects of Competition  on Transmission  and
Distribution Costs in the Municipal Electric Industry." Land Economics 64, 338-346.
Neuberg,  L.  (1977),  "Two  Issues  in  the  Municipal  Ownership  of  Electric  Power
Distribution Systems." Bell Journal  of Economics 8, 303-323.
New Zealand Ministry of Energy (1989),  "Performance  Measures  and Economies of Scale
in the New Zealand Electricity Distribution System." Wellington, Ministry of Energy.
Pestieu, P. and Tulkens, H. (1990), "Assessing the Performance  of Public Sector  Activities:
Some  Recent  Evidence  from the Productive  Efficiency  Viewpoint."  Discussion  Paper N°9060,
CORE, Universit6 Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
Pollitt,  M.  (1995),  Ownership and Performance in  Electric Utilities: the  International
Evidence on Privatization  and Efficiency, Oxford University Press.34
Roberts, M. (1986),  "Economies  of Density and  Size in the Transmission  and Distribution
of Electric Power." Land Economics 62 (4), 337-346.
Rossi,  M.  (2002),  "Production  Frontier Analysis:  Electricity  Distribution  Sector in  South
America." Unpublished Thesis,  University of Oxford.
Rossi, M.  and C. Ruzzier (2000),  "On the Regulatory Application of Efficiency  Measures."
Utilities Policy, vol. 9, 81-92, June.
Salvanes,  K. and S. Tj0tta (1994),  "Productivity Differences in Multiple Output  Industries:
An Empirical Application  to Electricity Distribution." Journal  of Productivity Analysis 5 (1), 23-
43.
Scarsi, G. (1999),  "Local Electricity Distribution in Italy: Comparative Efficiency Analysis
and Methodological  Cross-Checking."  London Economics, December.
Seiford,  L.  and  R.  Thrall  (1990),  "Recent  Developments  in  DEA:  The  Mathematical
Programming  Approach to Frontier Analysis." Journal  of Econometrics  46, 7-38.
Thompson, H.  (1997),  "Cost Efficiency  in Power Procurement  and Delivery  Service  in the
Electric Utility Industry." Land Economics 73 (3), August, 287-296.
Weyman-Jones,  T.  (1991),  "Productive  Efficiency  in  a  Regulated  Industry.  The  Area
Electricity Boards of England and Wales." Energy Economics, April,  116-122.
Weyman-Jones,  T.  (1992),  "Problems  of Yardstick  Regulation  in Electricity Distribution".
In Bishop,  Kay and Mayer, The Regulatory Challenge, Oxford University Press.
Zhang,  Y.  and R.  Bartels  (1998),  "The Effect of Sample  Size  on  the  mean Efficiency  in
DEA with Application  to Electricity Distribution  in Australia." Journal of Productivity Analysis
9,  187-204.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2881  Returns  to Investment  in Education:  George  Psacharopoulos  September 2002  N.  Vergara
A Further Update  Harry Anthony  Patrinos  30432
WPS2882  Politically Optimal  Tariffs:  Dorsati  Madani  September 2002  P. Flewitt
An Application to  Egypt  Marcelo Olarreaga  32724
WPS2883  Assessing the Distributional  Impact  B. Essama-Nssah  September 2002  0  Kootzemew
of Public Policy  35075
WPS2884  Privatization  and Labor Force  Alberto  Chong  September 2002  H. Sladovich
Restructuring  around the World  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes  37698
WPS2885  Poverty,  AIDS,  and Children's  Martha  Ainsworth  September 2002  H  Sladovich
Schooling: A Targeting  Dilemma  Deon Filmer  37698
WPS2886  Examining the Feasibility of  Jerry  R.  Skees  September 2002  E. Laguidao
Livestock Insurance in Mongolia  Ayurzana  Enkh-Amgalan  82450
WPS2887  The Demand for Commodity  Alexander  Sarris  September  2002  M.  Fernandez
Insurance by Developing  Country  33766
Agricultural  Producers: Theory and
an Application to Cocoa in Ghana
WPS2888  A Poverty Analysis  Macroeconomic  Luiz A. Pereira da Silva  September 2002  R.  Yazigi
Simulator (PAMS)  Linking Household  B. Essama-Nssah  37176
Surveys with Macro-Models  Issouf Samake
WPS2889  Environmental  Performance  Rating  Hua Wang  September 2002  Y. D'Souza
and Disclosure: China's Green-  Jun  Bi  31449





WPS2890  Sector Organization,  Governance,  Antonio  Estache  September 2002  G. Chenet-Smith
and the  Inefficiency of  African  Water  Eugene  Kouassi  36370
Utilities
WPS2890  Sector  Organization,  Governance,  Antonio  Estache  September 2002  G. Chenet-Smith
and the  Inefficiency of  African  Water  Eugene  Kouassi  36370
Utilities
WPS2891  Trends in the Education Sector from  Nga Nguyet Nguyen  September 2002  E.  Khine
1993-98  37471
WPS2892  Productivity or  Endowments?  Hiau Looi Kee  September 2002  P. Flewitt
Sectoral Evidence for Hong Kong's  32724
Aggregate Growth
WPS2893  Banking  on Foreigners: The  Behavior  Maria Soledad  Martinez  September 2002  A. Yaptenco
of International Bank  Lending to  Peria  31823
Latin America, 1985-2000  Andrew  Powell
Ivanna  Vladkova Hollar
WPS2894  Telecommunications  Sector  Jean-Paul Azam  September 2002  P.  Sintim-Aboagye
Reforms in Senegal  Magueye  Dia  38526
Tchetche  N'GuessanPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2895  Telecommunications  Reform  in  Jean-Jacques  Laffont  September 2002  P. Sintim-Aboagye
C6te  d'lvoire  Tchetche  N'Guessan  38526
WPS2896  The Wage Labor Market and  John  Luke Gallup  September 2002  E. Khine
Inequality in Vietnam  in the 1990s  37471
WPS2897  Gender Dimensions of Child Labor  Emily  Gustafsson-Wright  October 2002  M.  Correia
and Street Children in Brazil  Hnin Hnin  Pyne  39394
WPS2898  Relative Returns to Policy Reform:  Alexandre Samy de Castro  October 2002  R.  Yazigi
Evidence from  Controlled Cross-  Ian Goldin  37176
Country  Regressions  Luiz A. Pereira da Silva
WPS2899  The Political Economy of Fiscal  Benn Eifert  October 2002  J. Schwartz
Policy and Economic Management  Alan Gelb  32250
in Oil-Exporting  Countries  Nils  Borje Tallroth
WPS2900  Economic  Structure,  Productivity,  Uwe  Deichmann  October 2002  Y. D'Souza
and Infrastructure  Quality in  Marianne Fay  31449
Southern Mexico  Jun Koo
Somik V. Lall
WPS2901  Decentralized Creditor-Led  Marinela E. Dado  October 2002  R.  Vo
Corporate  Restructuring:  Cross-  Daniela  Klingebiel  33722
Country  Experience
WPS2902  Aid,  Policy, and Growth in  Paul Collier  October 2002  A. Kitson-Walters
Post-Conflict  Societies  Anke Hoeffler  33712
WPS2903  Financial Globalization:  Unequal  Augusto de la Torre  October 2002  P. Soto
Blessings  Eduardo  Levy Yeyati  37892
Sergio L. Schmukler
WPS2904  Law and Finance:  Why Does Legal  Thorsten  Beck  October 2002  K. Labrie
Origin Matter?  Asl1  Demirgu,-Kunt  31001
Ross Levine
WPS2905  Financing  Patterns Around the World:  Thorsten  Beck  October 2002  K. Labrie
The Role of  Institutions  Ashl  Demirgu,-Kunt  31001
Vojislav  Maksimovic
WPS2906  Macroeconomic  Effects of Private  Lourdes Trujillo  October 2002  G. Chenet-Smith
Sector Participation  in Latin  Noelia Martin  36370
America's  Infrastructure  Antonio Estache
Javier Campos